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Abstract
Despite the linearity of its encoding, compressed sensing may be used to provide a limited form of data protection
when random encoding matrices are used to produce sets of low-dimensional measurements (ciphertexts). In this
paper we quantify by theoretical means the resistance of the least complex form of this kind of encoding against
known-plaintext attacks. For both standard compressed sensing with antipodal random matrices and recent multiclass
encryption schemes based on it, we show how the number of candidate encoding matrices that match a typical
plaintext-ciphertext pair is so large that the search for the true encoding matrix inconclusive. Such results on the
practical ineffectiveness of known-plaintext attacks underlie the fact that even closely-related signal recovery under
encoding matrix uncertainty is doomed to fail.
Practical attacks are then exemplified by applying compressed sensing with antipodal random matrices as a
multiclass encryption scheme to signals such as images and electrocardiographic tracks, showing that the extracted
information on the true encoding matrix from a plaintext-ciphertext pair leads to no significant signal recovery quality
increase. This theoretical and empirical evidence clarifies that, although not perfectly secure, both standard compressed
sensing and multiclass encryption schemes feature a noteworthy level of security against known-plaintext attacks,
therefore increasing its appeal as a negligible-cost encryption method for resource-limited sensing applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper elaborates on the possibility of exploiting Compressed Sensing (CS) [1], [2] not only to reduce the
resource requirements for signal acquisition, but also to protect the acquired data so that their information is hidden
from unauthorised receivers. A number of prior analyses [3]–[7] show that, although the encoding performed by
CS cannot be regarded as perfectly secure, practical encryption is still provided at a very limited cost, either at the
analog-to-digital interface or immediately after it, in early digital-to-digital processing stages.
Such a lightweight encryption scheme may be particularly beneficial to acquisition systems within the framework
of wireless sensor networks [8] where large amounts of data are locally acquired by sensor nodes with extremely
tight resource budgets, and afterwards transmitted to a remote node for further processing. When the security of these
transmissions is an issue, low-resource techniques that help balancing the trade-off between encryption strength and
computational cost may offer an attractive design alternative to the deployment of separate conventional encryption
stages.
An encryption scheme based on CS leverages the fact that, in its framework, a high-dimensional signal is encoded
by linear projection on a random subspace, thus producing a set of low-dimensional measurements. These can be
mapped back to the acquired signal only under prior assumptions on its sparsity [9] and a careful choice of random
subspaces such as those defined by antipodal random (also known as Bernoulli random [10], [11]) encoding matrices.
In addition, suitable sparse signal recovery algorithms [12]–[14] are required to decode the original signal. These
must be applied with an exact knowledge of the subspace on which the signal was projected. In complete absence
of this information the acquired signal is unrecoverable. Hence, this subspace may be generated from a shared
secret between the transmitter and intended receivers that enables their high-quality signal recovery.
If, on the other hand, the above subspace is only partially known, a low-quality version of the signal may
be recovered from its measurements, with a degradation that increases gracefully with the amount of missing
information on the projection subspace. By exploiting this effect, multiclass encryption schemes were devised [5],
[7] in which high-class users are able to decode high-quality information starting from a complete knowledge of the
shared secret, while lower-class users only recover a low-quality approximation of the acquired signal starting from
partial knowledge of the secret. In order to take full advantage of this scheme, its security must be quantitatively
assessed against potential cryptanalyses. The theoretical and empirical evidence provided in [7] dealt with statistical
attacks on the measurements produced by universal random encoding matrices [10].
In this paper we address the resistance of an embodiment of CS against Known-Plaintext Attacks (KPAs), i.e.,
in threatening situations where a malicious eavesdropper has gained access to an instance of the signal (plaintext)
and its corresponding random measurements (ciphertext), and from this information tries to infer the corresponding
instance of an antipodal random encoding matrix. KPAs are more threatening than attacks solely based on observing
the ciphertext. Yet, we will show how both simple and multiclass encryption based on CS exhibit a noteworthy
level of resistance against this class of attacks due to the nature of the encoding.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we briefly review the fundamentals of CS and multiclass encryption
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in the two-class case, which distinguishes between first-class receivers authorised to reconstruct the signal with full
quality and second-class receivers with reduced decoding quality.
Section III describes KPAs as delivered both by eavesdroppers and second-class receivers who aim at improving
the quality of their signal recovery. There, it is shown that the expected number of candidate solutions matching
a plaintext-ciphertext pair is enormous, thus implying that finding the true encoding matrix among such a huge
solution set is practically infeasible. To extend this analysis, we also attack the two-class encryption scheme by
using recovery algorithms that compensate encoding matrix perturbations [15], [16] as suffered by a second-class
receiver. Their performances are shown to be equal to a standard decoding algorithm [13] that does not attempt
such compensation, i.e., that legitimately recovers the acquired signal at the prescribed quality level.
In Section IV the previous KPAs are exemplified for electrocardiographic tracks (ECG) and images containing
sensitive identification text. For all these cases we give empirical evidence on how, even in favourable attack
conditions, the encoding matrices produced by KPAs perform poorly when trying to decode any further ciphertext.
Theoretical and empirical evidence allows us to conclude that compressed sensing-based encryption, albeit not
perfectly secure [3], provides some security properties and defines a framework in which their violation is non-
trivial. The Appendices report the proofs of the Propositions and Theorems given in Section III.
A. Relation to Prior Work
To prove how CS and multiclass encryption provide a satisfying level of privacy even against informed attacks, this
work addresses the problem of finding all the instances of an antipodal random encoding matrix that map a known
plaintext to the corresponding ciphertext, when both quantities are deterministic and digitally represented. Our
analysis hinges on the connection between linear encoding by antipodal random matrices, the subset-sum problem
[17] and its expected number of solutions [18]. While the authors of [3] proved how CS lacks perfect secrecy in the
Shannon sense [19], both [3] and [4] contrasted this with computational security evidence substantially based on
brute-force attacks. Our improvement in the specific, yet practically important case of antipodal random encoding
matrices is in that our analysis predicts how the expected number of candidate solutions to a KPA varies with the
plaintext dimensionality and its digital representation.
In addition, we evaluate specific attacks to multiclass encryption by CS in the case of lower-class users attempting
to upgrade their recovery quality. To assess the resistance of this strategy against KPAs, we apply a similar theoretical
analysis. Then, we extend the attacks to include sparse signal recovery under matrix uncertainty [15], [16] based
on the idea that missing information [20], perturbations [21], [22] and basis mismatches [23] could be partially
compensated, although we verify that is not the case with the random perturbation entailed by multiclass encryption.
II. MULTICLASS ENCRYPTION BY COMPRESSED SENSING
A. A Brief Review of Compressed Sensing
The encryption schemes we consider in this paper are based on Compressed Sensing (CS) [1], [2], a mathematical
framework in which a signal represented by a vector x ∈ Rn is acquired by applying a linear, dimensionality-
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reducing transformation A : Rn → Rm (i.e., the encoding matrix) to generate a vector of measurements y = Ax, y ∈
Rm,m < n. To enable the recovery of x given y, CS leverages the fact that x is known to be sparse in a proper
basis D, i.e., for any instance of x its representation is x = Ds where s ∈ Rn has a number of non-zero entries at
most k  n. The results presented in this paper are independent of D, which we consider an orthonormal basis for
the sake of simplicity. In addition, the encoding matrix A must obey some information-preserving guarantees [24],
[25] that we assume verified throughout this paper and essentially impose that m = O(k log n). The most relevant
fact here is that when A is a typical realisation of a random matrix with independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) entries following a subgaussian distribution [26] we are reassured that signal recovery is possible regardless
of the chosen basis D. In fact, some signal recovery algorithms exist for which guarantees can be given with
very high probability [12] along with an ever-growing plethora of fast iterative methods capable of reconstructing
x starting from y, A and D. An essential decoding scheme is the convex optimisation problem known as basis
pursuit with denoising,
xˆ = arg min
ξ∈Rn
∥∥D−1ξ∥∥
1
s.t. ‖Aξ − y‖2 ≤ ω (BPDN)
where the `1-norm in the objective function promotes the sparsity of xˆ with respect to D, while the `2-norm
constraint enforces its fidelity to the measurements up to a threshold ω ≥ 0 that accounts for noise sources. In
particular, we here concentrate on operators A ∈ {−1, 1}m×n that are realisations of an antipodal random matrix
with i.i.d. entries and equiprobable symbols {−1, 1} [10]; such matrices are known to verify the above guarantees,
and are remarkably (i) simple, and therefore suitable to be generated, implemented and stored in digital devices
(ii) random in nature, thus suggesting the possibility of exploiting such randomness to generate an encryption
mechanism using the linear encoding scheme of CS. Due to their limited set of possible symbols {−1, 1}, such
antipodal random matrices are more easily subject to cryptanalysis; for this reason, we tackle them as a baseline
for those defined by a larger set of symbols.
B. Security and Two-Class Encryption by Compressed Sensing
1) A Security Perspective: the knowledge of A is necessary in the recovery of x from y, since any error in its
entries reflects on the quality of the recovered signal [21]. A number of security analyses leveraging this fundamental
fact were introduced [3], [4], [7] in which CS is regarded as a symmetric encryption scheme, where the plaintext x
is mapped to the ciphertext y by means of the linear transformation operated by A, i.e., the encryption algorithm.
The ciphertext is then stored or transmitted, and its intended receivers may decrypt x by knowing y, the sparsity
basis D, and by having a prior agreement on the encryption key or shared secret that is necessary to reproduce A.
The ideal requirement for a secure application of CS (as noted in [3], [27]) is that any encoding matrix instance
is used for at most one plaintext-ciphertext pair; this implies the use of a potentially infinite sequence of encoding
matrices {A[t]}t∈N. In violation of this non-repeatability hypothesis, each A[t] could be simply recovered by
collecting n linearly independent plaintext-ciphertext pairs related by it, i.e., by solving a linear system of equations
with the mn entries of A[t] as the unknowns.
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In practice, the encoding matrices are obtained by algorithmic expansion of the shared secret, e.g., by using the
key as the seed of a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) which outputs a reproducible bitstream. Due to its
deterministic and finite-state nature, this stream yields a periodic sequence of encoding matrices {A[t mod P ]}t∈N
repeating with period P , where each A[t] is obtained by mapping mn distinct bits to antipodal symbols.
Thus, the non-repeatability hypothesis will be granted by a system-level choice of an encryption key and PRNG
that makes P large enough to exceed any reasonable observation time.
However, such pseudo-random bitstreams may themselves be vulnerable to cryptanalysis if a few of their bits are
exposed. As a simple example of this threat, assume that the encoding matrices are generated by a maximal-length
shift register sequence [28, Chapter 4], for which a Bkey bit seed grants P =
⌊
2Bkey−1
mn
⌋
. Regrettably, such a
sequence is easily cryptanalysed from only 2Bkey of its bits by the well-known Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [29].
Hence, a successful KPA that retrieves even part of an encoding matrix, e.g., one of its rows, may expose just
enough information to reveal the key and therefore break a CS-based encryption. To contrast this type of threat,
our analysis shows how KPAs are incapable of revealing missing information on the true encoding matrices, whose
symbols remain undetermined.
2) Two-Class Encryption: in an extended version of this encryption framework, i.e., two-class encryption by CS
[5], [7], we consider a first sequence of matrices {A(0),[t]}t∈N, A(0),[t] ∈ {−1, 1}m×n obtained by pseudo-random
expansion of a seed Key
(
A(0)
)
. In parallel, a sequence of index pair sets {C(0),[t]}t∈N, C(0),[t] ⊂ {0, . . . ,m −
1} × {0, . . . , n − 1} is obtained by pseudo-random expansion of a seed Key (C(0)). We then generate a second
sequence of matrices {A(1),[t]}t∈N whose elements A(1),[t] are obtained by combining A(0),[t], C(0),[t] as
A
(1),[t]
j,l =
A
(0),[t]
j,l if (j, l) 6∈ C(0),[t]
−A(0),[t]j,l if (j, l) ∈ C(0),[t]
(1)
with C(0),[t] indicating which entries of A(0),[t] must be sign-flipped to obtain A(1),[t], that is then used to encode
x into y. Thus, we consider a cardinality c for every C(0),[t], define η = c/mn the sign flipping density, and
let A(0), A(1), C(0) be generic, unique random matrix instances (that is, the matrix sequences will be implicitly
considered from now on). Given any plaintext x, the corresponding ciphertext y is produced as y = A(1)x, A(1)
being the true encoding matrix. Two-class encryption is then achieved by distributing Key
(
A(0)
)
to all authorised
receivers and Key
(
C(0)
)
only to first-class receivers. In fact, when y is communicated, receivers knowing both
Key
(
A(0)
)
and Key
(
C(0)
)
are able to rebuild the corresponding A(1) used in the encoding and reconstruct x with
full quality by solving BPDN with ω = 0.
On the other hand, second-class receivers may only rebuild A(0) from their available information. For 0 < η  1
such a matrix is an approximation of the corresponding A(1), thus allowing signal recovery with lower quality than
that achieved by first-class receivers. Furthermore, any receiver not knowing Key
(
A(0)
)
has no information on the
encoding matrix and is consequently unable to recover x, which remains encrypted.
In [7] we have characterised the effectiveness of this scheme by showing how eavesdroppers trying to compensate
their ignorance of the key by means of straightforward statistical analysis of y are presented with approximately
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Fig. 1. A two-class encryption scheme and the known-plaintext attacks being analysed from an eavesdropper (Eve) and a second-class user
(Steve).
Gaussian-distributed ciphertexts (converging with rate O(n−1)). In addition, if A(0) is an antipodal random matrix,
the same can be said of A(1) since the statistics of its equiprobable symbols are unaltered by C(0) used to build the
latter from the former. Hence, the ciphertext is statistically indistinguishable from the one that could be produced
by encoding the same plaintext with A(0) instead of A(1), and second-class users will also be unable to exploit the
statistical properties of y.
C. Signal Models and Assumptions
Since the attacks we present rely on deterministic knowledge of x and y, we assume throughout the paper that
both plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented by digital words. For simplicity, we let x = {xl}n−1l=0 be such that
xl ∈ {−L, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . , L} for some integer L > 0. Note that the number of bits representing the plaintext in
this fashion is at least Bx = dlog2(2L+ 1)e, so we may assume Bx is less than a few tens in typical embodiments
(actually, Bx ≤ 32 bit in typical signal processing applications). Consequently, the ciphertext will be represented
by {yl}m−1l=0 , where each yl is quantised with By = Bx + dlog2 ne bit that avoid any information loss.
III. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
In view of quantifying the resistance of this scheme to threatening cryptanalyses, we now consider situations in
which an attacker gains access to a given, exact value of the plaintext x corresponding to a ciphertext y. Based
on this knowledge, the attacker aims at computing the true encoding A(1) such that y = A(1)x. In the following
we will consider a KPA by assuming that only one (x, y) pair is known for a certain A(1), consistently with the
hypothesis that A(1) is never reused in the encoding (as detailed in Section II-B1). This type of attack gives rise
to different strategies (see Fig. 1) whether the attacker knows nothing except the (x, y) pair (a pure eavesdropper,
Eve) or it is a second-class receiver knowing also the partially correct encoding A(0) and attempting to complete
its knowledge of A(1) (we will call this malicious second-class user Steve and its KPA a class-upgrade).
For the sake of simplicity, both KPAs are here characterised on a single row1 of A(1), while a complete KPA will
entail m of such attacks. Furthermore, we note that the analysis is carried out in full compliance with Kerckhoffs’s
1We denote with Aj the j-th row of a matrix A.
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principle [30], i.e., the only information that the attackers are missing is their respective part of the encryption
key, while any other detail on the sparsity basis, as well as two-class encryption specifications is here regarded as
known.
A. Eavesdropper’s Known-Plaintext Attack
Given a plaintext x and the corresponding ciphertext y = A(1)x we now assume the perspective of Eve and attempt
to recover A(1)j with a set of antipodal symbols Aˆ
(1)
j = {Aˆ(1)j,l }n−1l=0 such that
yj =
n−1∑
l=0
Aˆ
(1)
j,l xl (2)
Moreover, to favour the attacker2 we assume all xl 6= 0. We now introduce a combinatorial optimisation problem
at the core of the analysed KPAs.
Definition 1 (Subset-Sum Problem). Let {ul}n−1l=0 , ul ∈ {1, . . . , L} ⊂ N+ and υ ∈ N+. We define subset-sum
problem (SSP) [17, Chap. 4] the problem of assigning n binary variables bl ∈ {0, 1}, l = 0, . . . , n− 1 such that
υ =
n−1∑
l=0
blul (3)
We define solution any {bl}n−1l=0 verifying (3). With the above definitions, the density of this problem is defined as
[31]
δ(n,L) =
n
log2 L
(4)
Although in general a SSP is NP-complete, not all of its instances are equally hard. In fact, it is known that high-
density instances (i.e., δ(n,L) > 1) have plenty of solutions found or approximated by, e.g., dynamic programming,
whereas low-density instances are typically hard, although for special cases polynomial-time algorithms have been
found [31]. Moreover, such low-density hard SSP instances have been used in cryptography to develop the family
of public-key knapsack cryptosystems [32], [33] although most have been broken with polynomial-time algorithms
[34].
Proposition 1 (Eve’s KPA). The KPA to A(1)j given (x, y) is equivalent to a SSP where each ul = |xl|, the variables
bl =
1
2 (sign (xl) Aˆ
(1)
j,l + 1) and the sum υ =
1
2
(
yj +
∑n−1
l=0 |xl|
)
. This SSP has a true solution {b¯l}n−1l=0 that is
mapped to the row A(1)j , and other candidate solutions that verify (3) but correspond to matrix rows Aˆ
(1)
j 6= A(1)j .
This mapping is explained in Appendix A, and we define (x, y,A(1)j ) a problem instance. In our case we see that
the density (4) is high since n is large and log2 L is fixed by the digital representation of x (e.g., so that Bx ≤ 64).
We are therefore operating in a region in which a solution of the SSP (3) is typically found in polynomial time. In
fact, the resistance of the analysed embodiment of CS against KPAs is not due to the hardness of the corresponding
2If any xl = 0 each corresponding summand would give no contribution to the sum (2), thus making Aˆ
(1)
j,l an undetermined variable in the
attack.
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Fig. 2. Sample average of the number of solutions for Eve’s KPA compared to the theoretical value of (5) for L = 104.
SSP but, as we show below, to the huge number of candidate solutions as n increases, among which an attacker
should find the only true solution to guess a single row of A(1). Since no a priori criterion exists to select them,
we consider them indistinguishable. The next Theorem3 calculates the expected number of candidate solutions to
Eve’s KPA by applying the theory developed in [18].
Theorem 1 (Expected number of solutions for Eve’s KPA). For large n, the expected number of candidate solutions
of the KPA in Proposition 1, in which (i) all the coefficients {ul}n−1l=0 are i.i.d. uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , L},
and (ii) the true solution {b¯l}n−1l=0 is drawn with equiprobable and independent binary values, is
SEve(n,L) n→∞' 2
n
L
√
3
pin
(5)
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. This result (as well as the whole statistical mechanics framework
from which it is derived) gives no hint on how much (5) is representative of finite-n behaviours. To compensate
for that, we here enumerate by means of the binary programming solver in CPLEX [35] all the solutions to several
small-n problem instances of Proposition 1 and verify that, even non-asymptotically, the expression (5) can be
used to effectively estimate the expected number of candidate solutions to Eve’s KPA. Such numerical evidence
is reported in Fig. 2, where the sample average of the number of solutions SˆEve(n,L) to 50 randomly generated
problem instances with L = 104 and n = 16, . . . , 32 is plotted and compared with (5).
The remarkable matching observed therein allows us to estimate, for example, that a KPA to the encoding of a
grayscale image of n = 64× 64 pixel quantised with Bx = 8 bit (unsigned, i.e., L = 128, n = 4096) would have
to discriminate on the average between 1.25 · 101229 equally good candidate solutions for each of the rows of the
encoding matrix. This number is not far from the total possible rows, 24096 = 1.04 · 101233. Hence, any attacker
using this strategy is faced with a deluge of candidate solutions, from which it would choose one presumed to be
3 n→∞' denotes asymptotic equality as n→∞.
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exact to attempt a guess on a single row of A(1).
A legitimate concern when the attacker is presented with such a set of solutions is that most of them could
be good approximations of the true encoding matrix row A(1)j . To see whether this is the case, we quantify the
difference between A(1)j and the corresponding candidates Aˆ
(1)
j resulting from a KPA in terms of their Hamming
distance, i.e., as the number of entries in which they differ.
Theorem 2 (Expected number of solutions for Eve’s KPA at Hamming distance h from the true one). The expected
number of candidate solutions at Hamming distance h from the true solution of the KPA in Proposition 1, in which
(i) all the coefficients {ul}n−1l=0 are i.i.d. uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , L}, (ii) the true solution {b¯l}n−1l=0 is drawn
with equiprobable and independent binary values, is
S(h)Eve(n,L) =
(
n
h
)
Ph(L)
2hLh
(6)
where Ph(L) is a polynomial in L whose coefficients are reported in Table I for h = 2, . . . , 15.
The proof of this Theorem and the derivation of Table I are reported in Appendix B. As before, we collect some
empirical evidence that the expression (6) correctly anticipates the expected number of solutions at a given Hamming
distance from the true one, noting that Theorem 2 holds for finite n. Figure 3 reports for n = {21, 23, . . . , 31}
the sample average, over the same 50 problem instances generated in the experimental evaluation of (5), of the
number of solutions to Eve’s KPA whose Hamming distance from the true one is a given value h = {2, . . . , 15}.
This sample average is compared against the value predicted by (6) with the polynomial coefficients in Table I.
The remarkable matching we observe allows us to estimate that, resuming the case of a grayscale image with
n = 4096, L = 128, only 1.95 · 1041 candidate solutions out of the average 1.25 · 101229 are expected to have a
Hamming distance h ≤ 16, while 6.33 · 1076 attain a Hamming distance h ≤ 32. Since these results apply to each
row of the matrix being inferred, this indicates how the chance that a randomly chosen candidate solution is close
to the true one is negligible.
Under repeated threat of Eve’s KPA, a system-level perspective would impose a change of encryption key (i.e.,
of encoding matrix sequence) whenever the probability of failure of repeated KPAs, pfail, drops below a desired
security level ζ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., at any time pfail ≥ ζ. Some insight on the encryption key lifetime T that guarantees
this is then obtained by modelling the repeated KPAs as i.i.d. Bernoulli trials, each leading to a successful choice of
the true solution with a probability that can be estimated with SEve(n,L)−1 in case of Eve’s KPA. With this pfail =
P [T KPA fail] = (1−SEve(n,L)−1)T , so we may choose the key lifetime as T ≤
[
log
(
1− SEve(n,L)−1
)]−1
log ζ
to ensure the security level set by ζ. Thus, we measure the key lifetime T in attack opportunities for Eve; however,
since SEve(n,L) is typically huge, the resulting T is also very large. As an example, by plugging n = 4096, L = 128
in (5) and assuming ζ = 0.9999, we obtain a key lifetime equivalent to at most T = 1.25·101225 attack opportunities.
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Fig. 3. Sample average of the number of solutions for Eve’s KPA at Hamming distance h from the true one, compared to the theoretical value
of (6) for L = 104 and n = 21, 23, . . . , 31.
B. Class-Upgrade Known-Plaintext Attack
A known-plaintext attack may also be attempted by Steve, a second-class receiver aiming to improve its signal
recovery performances with the intent of reaching the same quality of a first-class receiver. In this KPA, a partially
correct encoding matrix A(0) that differs from A(1) in c entries is also known in addition to x and y. With this
prior, Steve may compute ε = y−A(0)x = ∆Ax where ∆A = A(1)−A(0) here is an unknown matrix with ternary
entries in {−2, 0, 2}. Hence, Steve performs a KPA by searching for a set of ternary symbols {∆Aj,l}n−1l=0 such
that
εj =
n−1∑
l=0
∆Aj,lxl (7)
of which it is known that ∆Aj,l 6= 0 only in c cases. Moreover, to ease the solution of this problem and make it
row-wise separable, we assume that Steve has access to an even more accurate information, i.e., the exact number cj
of non-zero entries for each row ∆Aj or equivalently the number of sign flips mapping A
(0)
j into the corresponding
A
(1)
j (clearly, the total number of non-zero entries in ∆A is c =
∑m−1
j=0 cj). By assuming this, we may prove the
equivalence between Steve’s KPA to each row of A(1) and a slightly adjusted SSP.
Definition 2 (γ-cardinality Subset-Sum Problem). Let {ul}n−1l=0 , ul ∈ {1, . . . , Q} ⊂ N+, γ ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N+
and υ ∈ N+. We define γ-cardinality subset-sum problem (γ-SSP) the problem of assigning n binary variables
bl ∈ {0, 1}, l = 0, . . . , n− 1 such that
υ =
n−1∑
l=0
blul (8)
γ =
n−1∑
l=0
bl (9)
We define solution any {bl}n−1l=0 verifying (8) and (9).
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5887
180
8
254
7
−140
9
1226
45
−266
9
334
9
−422
9
19328
315
9 −255
4
2613
112
−731
16
14701
320
−457
8
2233
32
−1415
16
259723
2240
10
1022
9
−2585
72
359105
4536
−7055
96
9869
108
−1725
16
28625
216
−48325
288
124952
567
11 −1023
5
16973
300
−60775
432
5463953
45360
−435941
2880
7449761
43200
−19811
96
1091629
4320
−2764663
8640
381773117
907200
12
4094
11
−2277
25
687791
2700
−72523
360
3907067
15120
−341143
1200
599327
1800
−7909
20
1045349
2160
−2205833
3600
41931328
51975
13 −1365
2
591721
3960
−2020421
4320
44385419
129600
−7815847
17280
116257063
241920
−3192163
5760
110721221
172800
−13148473
17280
19285357
20736
−20345507
17280
20646903199
13305600
14
16382
13
−44863
180
34353347
39600
−38237381
64800
1292711
1600
−42972293
51840
122732801
129600
−92420419
86400
53508931
43200
−76095383
51840
77441609
43200
−588168119
259200
866732192
289575
15 −16383
7
1074679
2548
−583763
360
113982839
110880
−12673507
8640
58584511
40320
−400088153
241920
1033251187
564480
−23927713
11520
193398181
80640
−98109773
34560
279340567
80640
−1060693411
241920
467168310097
80720640
TABLE I
TABLE OF COEFFICIENTS OF THE POLYNOMIALS Ph(L) =
∑h−1
j=1 p
h
j L
j IN (6) FOR h = 2, . . . , 15.
Proposition 2 (Steve’s KPA). The KPA to A(1)j given (x, y,A(0), cj), is equivalent to a γ-SSP where γ = cj ,
Q = 2L, υ = 12εj + Lcj , ul = −A(0)j,l xl + L and bl = 12
(
1− Aˆ
(1)
j,l
A
(0)
j,l
)
. This SSP has a true solution {b¯l}n−1l=0 that
is mapped to the row A(1)j , and other candidate solutions that verify (8) and (9) but correspond to matrix rows
Aˆ
(1)
j 6= A(1)j .
The derivation of Proposition 2 is reported in Appendix C. We define (x, y,A(0)j , A
(1)
j ) a problem instance. In
the following, we will denote with r = cj/n the row-density of perturbations. Since in [18] the γ-cardinality SSP
case is obtained as an extension of the results on the unconstrained SSP, we obtain the following Theorem.
Theorem 3 (Expected number of solutions for Steve’s KPA). For large n, the expected number of candidate
solutions of the KPA in Proposition 2, in which (i) all the coefficients {ul}n−1l=0 are i.i.d. uniformly drawn from
{1, . . . , 2L}, and (ii) the true solution {b¯l}n−1l=0 is drawn with equiprobable independent binary values, is
SSteve(n,L, r) n→∞'
√
3
2
r−1−nr (1− r)−1−n(1−r)
2pinL
(10)
The proof of Theorem 3 is reported in Appendix C. The number of candidate solutions found by Steve’s KPA is
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Fig. 4. Sample average of the number of solutions for Steve’s KPA compared to the theoretical value of (10) for L = 5 · 103 with row-density
of perturbations r = 5/n, 10/n, 15/n.
by many orders of magnitude smaller than Eve’s KPA, the reason being that Steve requires much less information
to achieve complete knowledge of the true encoding A(1). In order to provide numerical evidence, we find all the
solutions to Steve’s KPA by means of the binary programming solver in CPLEX on a set of 50 randomly generated
problem instances for L = 5 · 103, a row-density of perturbations r = 5/n, 10/n, 15/n and n = 20, . . . , 32 (except
for r = 5/n, whose solution enumeration is still computationally feasible up to n = 48). The sample average of
the number of solutions, SˆSteve(n,L, r), is reported in Fig. 4 and well predicted by the theoretical value in (10);
note that this approximation is increasingly accurate for large n. Moreover, by resuming the previous example our
n = 64×64 pixel grayscale image quantised at Bx = 8 bit and encoded with two-class CS using ∆A with r = 0.03
will have on the average 6.25 · 10234 candidate solutions of indistinguishable quality.
In terms of encryption key lifetime, leveraging the same considerations of Section III-A and simply replacing
SEve(n,L) with SSteve(n,L, r) yields the key lifetimes T with respect to class-upgrade attacks; as an example,
plugging n = 4096, L = 128, r = 0.03 in (10) and assuming ζ = 0.9999, yields at most T = 1.25 · 10231 attack
opportunities for Steve.
The previous KPA analyses hinge on a counting argument in a general setting, without any other side information
on the structure of A(1) or ∆A. As we will show in the experiments of Section IV, KPAs yield no advantage in
terms of recovery performances to unintended receivers. Obviously, as further prior information becomes available
(for example the knowledge that the unknown ∆A has additional structure, or that the original signal is distributed is
a non-uniform fashion [36], [37]) revealing the hidden information may be easier. Yet, this is true for any encryption
scheme in which either the encryption key or the plaintext have a non-uniform distribution and is out of the scope
of this analysis.
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C. Signal Recovery-Based Class-Upgrade Attacks
Class-upgrade attacks to two-class encryption schemes are closely related to a recovery problem setting that has
attracted some attention in prior works, i.e., sparse signal recovery under matrix uncertainty. To recast our problem
in this setting, we may construct such a signal recovery-based attack by letting A(1) = A(0) + ∆A as the encoding
matrix, where A(0) is known a priori and ∆A is an unknown random perturbation matrix. This information is paired
with the knowledge of the ciphertext y and a prior on the unknown plaintext x, that is known to be sparse in a basis
D. Thus, we attempt the joint recovery of x and ∆A, eventually just leading to a refinement of the estimated xˆ. Two
main algorithms are capable of addressing specifically this problem setup for a generic ∆A, namely Generalised
Approximate Message-Passing under Matrix Uncertainty (MU-GAMP [16]) and Sparsity-cognisant Total Least-
Squares (S-TLS [15]).
Although appealing, this joint recovery approach can be anticipated to fail for multiple reasons. First, this attack
is intrinsically harder than Steve’s KPA in that the true plaintext x is here unknown. Whatever ∆A is a candidate
solution to Steve’s KPA given x, is also a possible solution of joint recovery with the same x as a further part of
the solution. Since we know from Section III-B that Steve’s KPA typically has a huge number of indistinguishable
and equally-sparse candidate solutions, at least as many will verify the joint recovery problem when the plaintext
is also unknown. Hence, this approach has negligible odds of yielding more information on ∆A than Steve’s KPA.
Note that this relationship between the set of solutions to Steve’s KPA and joint recovery-based attacks also
prevents the latter from being of any use as a refinement step to improve ∆A after its guess by an initial KPA. In
fact, recovering an estimate of x in this case would be to no avail, since the true x must be known a priori in the
initial KPA.
Notwithstanding this, the above joint recovery approach estimates x along with a new ∆A; thus, the best-case
achievable signal recovery is the true x, for which the candidate solutions in ∆A are at best identical to those of
the initial KPA, as by (7) they must verify ε = ∆Ax. No improvement is therefore obtained by applying joint
recovery after Steve’s KPA.
Furthermore, going back to simple joint-recovery, note that it amounts to solving y = A(0)x + ∆Ax with ∆A
and x unknown, that is clearly a non-linear equality involving non-convex/non-concave operators. In general, this is
a hard problem; both the aforementioned algorithms are indeed able to effectively compensate matrix uncertainties
when ∆A depends on a low-dimensional, deterministic set of parameters. However, such a model does not apply
to two-class encryption: even if ∆A is c-sparse, it has no deterministic structure – to make it so, one would need
to know the exact set C(0) of c index pairs at which the sign flipping randomly occurred, which by itself entails a
combinatorial search.
In fact, ∆A is uniform in the sense of [16] since it may be regarded as a realisation of a random matrix with
i.i.d. zero-mean, bounded-variance entries (as also detailed in [7]). Hence, we expect the accuracy of the estimate
xˆ with joint recovery (both using S-TLS and MU-GAMP) to agree with the uniform matrix uncertainty case of
[16], where negligible improvement is shown with respect to the (non-joint) recovery algorithm GAMP [13]. The
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Fig. 5. Average recovery signal-to-noise ratio performances of a class-upgrade attack using signal recovery under matrix uncertainty algorithms.
advocated reason is that the perturbation noise ε = ∆Ax is asymptotically Gaussian for a given x [16, Proposition
2.1].
We now provide some empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of joint recovery as a class-upgrade attack for
finite n,m and sparsity k. As an example, we let n = 256, m = 128, k = 20 and η = cmn ∈ [0.005, 0.1] and
generate 100 random instances of x = Ds with s which is k-sparse with respect to a randomly selected, known
orthonormal basis D. For each η, we also generate 100 pairs of matrices (A(0), A(1)) related as (1) and encode x by
y = A(1)x. Signal recovery is performed by MU-GAMP, S-TLS and GAMP. To maximise their performances, each
of the algorithms is run with parameters provided by a “genie” revealing the exact value of the unknown features
of x. In particular, MU-GAMP and GAMP are provided with an i.i.d. Bernoulli-Gaussian sparsity-enforcing signal
model [13], [38] having the exact mean, variance and sparsity level of the instances s. As far as the perturbation
∆A is concerned, MU-GAMP is given the probability distribution of its i.i.d. entries. On the other hand, GAMP
is initialised with the noise variance of ε = ∆Ax, that is assumed Gaussian with i.i.d. entries. S-TLS is run in
its locally-optimal, polynomial-time version [15, Section IV-B] and fine-tuned with respect to its regularisation
parameter as η varies.
We here focus on measuring the Average4 Recovery Signal-to-Noise Ratio of the latter, ARSNR (dB) =
10 log10 Eˆ
( ‖x‖22
‖x−xˆ‖22
)
reported in Fig. 5. The standard deviation from this average is less than 1.71 dB in all the
reported curves. The maximum ARSNR performance gap between GAMP and MU-GAMP is 1.22 dB while S-TLS
attains generally lower performances for high values of η. These observed performances confirm what is also found
in [16], i.e., that GAMP, MU-GAMP and S-TLS substantially attain the same performances under uniform matrix
uncertainty. As expected, class-upgrade attacks based on joint recovery are ineffective even for finite n and m,
since GAMP under the same conditions is the reference case adopted in [7, Section IV] for the design of two-class
encryption schemes.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. Effectiveness of (a) Eve and (b) Steve’s KPA in recovering a hidden ECG. Each point is a guess of the encoding matrix A(1) whose
quality is assessed by decoding the ciphertext y′ corresponding to the known plaintext x′ (RSNR′) and by decoding a new ciphertext y′′
(RSNR′′). The Euclidean distance from the average (RSNR′,RSNR′′) is highlighted by colour gradient.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This Section aims at providing an intuitive appreciation of the poor quality obtained by signal recovery with
KPA solutions. While the objective of KPAs is cryptanalysing the true encoding matrix to ultimately retrieve the
encryption key, we here focus on the properties of KPA solutions as encoding matrix guesses that can, in the
attackers’ belief, improve their signal recovery quality. Thus, we verify that this improvement does not occur by
exemplifying practical cases of KPAs in a common framework, which follows this procedure:
4Eˆ(·) denotes the sample average over a set of trials.
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1) Attack: an attacker performing a KPA gains access to a single plaintext-ciphertext pair (x′, y′), and attacks the
corresponding true encoding matrix A(1) row-by-row; we here infer each row A(1)j by generating instances of
an i.i.d. antipodal random vector until a large number of candidate solutions Aˆ(1)j that verify y
′
j = Aˆ
(1)
j x
′ is
found.
Thus, the inferred Aˆ(1) is composed by collecting the outputs of m Monte Carlo random searches for the
corresponding matrix rows. This generation approach is preferable to solving each attacker’s KPA by means of
CPLEX’s binary programming solver for two reasons. Firstly, it is known from Theorem 1 that the expected
number of solutions is very large and thus the probability of finding one by random search is far from being
negligible, while its computational cost is relatively low. Secondly, the theoretical conditions [24] that guarantee
x′ can be retrieved from y′ despite the dimensionality reduction are applicable when A(1) is a typical realisation
of an antipodal random matrix. On the contrary, integer programming solvers explore solutions in a systematic
way, and tend to generate them in an ordered fashion. When only some of these solutions are considered (as
obliged when n is large), this ordered approach yields non-typical sets of Aˆ(1)j that could be very distant from
A
(1)
j ;
2) Signal Recovery: to test its guess Aˆ(1), the attacker may then pretend to ignore the known x′ and recover an
approximation xˆ′ from (y′, Aˆ(1)) by using a high-performance signal recovery algorithm such as GAMP [13],
optimally tuned as in Section III-C. In this setting we measure its accuracy by the Recovery Signal-to-Noise
Ratio, RSNR′ = 10 log10
‖x′‖22
‖x′−xˆ′‖22 , which is the only quality indicator in the attacker’s perspective for Aˆ
(1).
The RSNR′ performances are here expected to match those of a (first-class) receiver fully informed on A(1),
as the equality y′ = Aˆ(1)x′ is verified regardless of the exactness of Aˆ(1);
3) Verification: as a further test of Aˆ(1), the attacker attempts the recovery of a second, unknown plaintext x′′
encoded as y′′ = A(1)x′′, of which it is only known that it was obtained with the same encoding matrix as y′.
The recovery xˆ′′ is then obtained by means of GAMP, yielding a new RSNR′′ = 10 log10
‖x′′‖22
‖x′′−xˆ′′‖22 unknown
to the attacker. If any point with high RSNR′′ ≈ RSNR′ is found, this will indicate the attacker’s success at
guessing Aˆ(1) close to the true A(1). We will show how this never occurs with a large number of candidate
solutions, and detail how the observed (RSNR′,RSNR′′) pairs are distributed.
Both the practical examples of Eve and Steve’s KPA follow the same procedure, with the exception that Eve directly
generates Aˆ(1)j , whereas Steve generates each row Aˆ
(1)
j by random search of the index set C
(0)
j that maps the known
A
(0)
j to the guess Aˆ
(1)
j that verifies y
′
j = Aˆ
(1)
j x
′. Coherently with the theoretical setting of Section III-B, we also
assume that Steve knows that exactly cj entries of A(0) have been flipped in each row of A(1). Repeating this
search for m rows in both attacks provides Eve and Steve’s candidate solutions Aˆ(1), of which we will study how
the corresponding (RSNR′,RSNR′′) pairs are distributed as mentioned above.
A. Electrocardiographic Signals
We now consider ECG signals from the MIT PhysioNet database [39] sampled at fs = 256 Hz and encoded as
described, from two windows x′, x′′ of n = 256 samples (and quantised with Bx = 12 bit) into the measurement
CAMBARERI et al.: ON KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS TO A COMPRESSED SENSING-BASED ENCRYPTION: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS17
vectors y′, y′′ of dimensionality m = 90. Decoding is allowed by the sparsity level of the windowed signal when
decomposed with D chosen as a Symmlet-6 orthonormal wavelet basis [40].
We generate 2000 candidate solutions for both Eve and Steve’s KPA that correspond to the recovery performances
reported in Fig. 6. While both malicious users are able to reconstruct the known plaintext x′ with a relatively high
average RSNR′ ≈ 25 dB (their KPAs indeed yield solutions to y′ = Aˆ(1)x′), on the second window of samples x′′
the eavesdropper achieves an average RSNR′′ ≈ −0.20 dB (Fig. 6a), whereas the second-class decoder achieves
an average RSNR′′ ≈ 12.15 dB (Fig. 6b) when the two-class encryption scheme is set to a sign flipping density
η = c/mn = 0.03 between A(0) and A(1). In this case, the nominal second-class RSNR = 11.08 dB when
reconstructing x′′ from y′′ with A(0), while the correlation coefficient between RSNR′ and RSNR′′ is 0.0140;
these figures clearly highlight the ineffectiveness of KPAs at inferring A(1) in this case. This is also confirmed by
the perceptual quality of xˆ′′ corresponding to the maximum RSNR′′ highlighted in Fig. 6.
B. Sensitive Text in Images
In this example we consider the same test images used in [7], i.e., 640 × 512 pixel grayscale images of people
holding a printed identification text concealed by means of two-class encryption. To reduce the computational burden
of KPAs we assume a block size of 64× 64 pixel, Bx = 8 bit per pixel, and encode the resulting n = 4096 pixels
into m = 2048 measurements. Signal recovery is performed by assuming the blocks have a sparse representation
on a 2D Daubechies-4 wavelet basis [40]. Two-class encryption is applied on the blocks containing printed text:
we choose two adjacent blocks x′, x′′ containing some letters and encoded with the same A(1); in this case, the
second-class decoder nominally achieves RSNR = 12.57 dB without attempting class-upgrade due to the flipping
of c = 251658 entries (corresponding to a perturbation density η = 0.03) in the encoding matrix.
In order to test Eve and Steve’s KPA we randomly generate 2000 solutions for the j-th row of the encoding given
x′, y′: it is worth noting that while in the previous case the signal dimensionality is sufficiently small to produce a
solution set in less than two minutes, in this case generating 2000 different solutions for a single row may take up
to several hours for some particularly hard instances.
By using these candidate solutions to find xˆ′, xˆ′′ we obtain the results of Figure 7: while both attackers attain an
average RSNR′ ≈ 33 dB on x′, Eve is only capable of reconstructing x′′ with an average RSNR′′ ≈ 0.14 dB where
Steve reaches an average RSNR′′ ≈ 12.80 dB with η = 0.03. Note also that, although some lucky guesses exist
with RSNR′′ > 12.57 dB, it is impossible to identify them by looking at RSNR′ since the correlation coefficient
between RSNR′ and RSNR′′ is −0.0041. Therefore, Steve cannot rely on observing the RSNR′ to choose the best
performing solution Aˆ(1), so both Eve and Steve’s KPAs are inconclusive. As a further perceptual evidence of this,
the best recoveries according to the RSNR′′ are reported in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analysed known-plaintext attacks as they may be carried out on standard CS schemes with
antipodal random encoding matrices as well as on the particular multiclass protocol developed in [7]. In particular,
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. Effectiveness of (a) Eve and (b) Steve’s KPA in recovering hidden image blocks. Each point is a guess of the encoding matrix A(1)
whose quality is assessed by decoding the ciphertext y′ corresponding to the known plaintext x′ (RSNR′) and by decoding a new ciphertext
y′′ (RSNR′′). The Euclidean distance from the average (RSNR′,RSNR′′) is highlighted by colour gradient.
the analysis was carried out from the two perspectives of an eavesdropper and a second-class user trying to guess the
true encoding matrix. In both cases we have mapped multiclass CS into a collection of subset-sum problems with
the aim of counting the candidate encoding matrices that match a given plaintext-ciphertext pair. In the eavesdropper
case we have found that for each row the expected number grows as O(n−
1
2 ·2n) – finding the true solution among
such huge sets is infeasible. A further study of the candidate solutions’ Hamming distance from the true one showed
that, as the dimensionality n increases, the expected number of solutions close to the true one is only a small fraction
of the solution set. As for the second-class user we have shown that depending on the available information on the
true encoding matrix, the expected number of solutions is significantly smaller, yet sufficiently high for large n to
reassure that a second-class user will not be able to perform class-upgrade. Moreover, other class-upgrade attacks
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based on signal recovery under matrix uncertainty were shown to yield almost identical performances to those of
a standard decoding algorithm.
Finally, we showed some simulated cases of KPAs on real-world signals such as ECG traces and images by
running a random search for a solution set corresponding to realistic plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and afterwards
tested whether any of the returned candidate solutions could lead to finding the true encoding matrix by testing
them on a successive ciphertext. In all the observed cases, we have found that the decoding performances match
the average RSNR level prescribed by the multiclass encryption protocol, i.e., both malicious users are unable to
successfully decode other plaintexts with significant and stable quality improvements with respect to their available
prior information.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS ON EAVESDROPPER’S KPA
The following definition is used in Appendices A and C.
Definition 3. We define the functions
Fp(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
ξp
1 + eaξ−b
dξ (11)
Gp(a, b) =
∫ 1
0
ξp
(1 + eaξ−b) (1 + eb−aξ)
dξ (12)
Proof of Proposition 1: Define the binary variables bl ∈ {0, 1} so that sign (xl) Aˆ(1)j,l = 2bl − 1 and the
positive coefficients ul = |xl|. With this choice (2) is equivalent to yj =
∑n−1
l=0 (2bl − 1)ul which leads to a SSP
with υ = 12
(
yj +
∑n−1
l=0 |xl|
)
. Since we know that each measurement yj must correspond to the inner product
between x and the row A(1)j , the latter’s entries are straightforwardly mapped to the true solution of this SSP,
{b¯l}n−1l=0 .
Proof of Theorem 1: Let us first note that, for large n, υ in Proposition 1 is an integer in the range {0, . . . , nL/2},
with the values outside this interval being asymptotically unachievable as n → ∞ (see [18, Section 4]). We let
τ = υ/nL, τ ∈ [0, 1/2], and a(τ) be the solution in a of the equation τ = F1(a, 0) (i.e. [18, (4.2)]) that is unique
since Fp(a, 0) in (11) is monotonically decreasing in a.
From [18, (4.1)] the number of solutions of a SSP with integer coefficients {ul}n−1l=0 uniformly distributed in
{1, . . . , L} is
SEve(τ, n, L) n→∞' e
n[a(τ)τ+
∫ 1
0
log(1+e−a(τ)ξ)dξ]√
2pinL2G2(a(τ), 0)
that we anticipate to have an approximately Gaussian profile (see Fig. 8). We now compute the average of
SEve(τ, n, L) in τ , that clearly depends on the probability of selecting any value of υ ∈ {0, . . . , nL2 }, i.e., of
τ ∈ [0, 12 ]. Since it is the result of a linear combination, the probability that a specific value of υ appears in a
random instance of the SSP is proportional to the number of solutions associated to it. In normalised terms, the
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Fig. 8. Gaussian approximation of SEve(τ, n, L) for n = 64, L = 104 by letting σ2 ≈ 1/12n.
PDF of τ must be proportional to SEve(τ, n, L), i.e., τ is distributed as
fτ (t) =
1∫ 1
2
0
SEve(ξ, n, L)dξ
SEve(t, n, L), 0 ≤ t ≤
1
2
0, otherwise
With fτ (t) we can compute the expected number of solutions:
Eτ [SEve(τ, n, L)] =
∫ 1
2
0
S2Eve(ξ, n, L)dξ∫ 1
2
0
SEve(ξ, n, L)dξ
(13)
Although we could resort to numerical integration, (13) can be simplified by exploiting what noted above, i.e.,
that SEve(τ, n, L) has an approximately Gaussian profile in τ (Fig. 8) with a maximum in τ = 1/4. Hence, the
expectation in τ becomes
Eτ [SEve(τ, n, L)] n→∞' SEve
(
1
4
, n, L
) ∫ ∞
−∞
(
e−
(ξ− 14 )
2
2σ2
)2
dξ
∫ ∞
−∞
e−
(ξ− 14 )
2
2σ2 dξ
= SEve
(
1
4
, n, L
)
1√
2
=
2n
L
√
3
pin
(14)
that is actually independent of the σ2 used in the Gaussian approximation, and in which we have exploited a(1/4) = 0
to obtain the statement of the theorem.
APPENDIX B
HAMMING DISTANCE OF KPA SOLUTIONS
Proof of Theorem 2: We here concentrate on counting the number of candidate solutions {bl}n−1l=0 to Eve’s
KPA that differ from the true one, {b¯l}n−1l=0 , by exactly h components (at Hamming distance h). We assume that
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K ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1} is the set of indexes for which there is a disagreement, i.e., for all l ∈ K we have bl = 1− b¯l;
this set has cardinality h, and is one among
(
n
h
)
possible sets. Since both {bl}n−1l=0 and {b¯l}n−1l=0 are solutions to
the same SSP, and that bl = b¯l are identical for l /∈ K,
∑
l∈K
(
1− b¯l
)
ul =
∑
l∈K b¯lul must hold, implying the
equality ∑
l∈K
b¯l=0
ul −
∑
l∈K
b¯l=1
ul = 0 (15)
Although (15) recalls the well-known partition problem, in our case K is chosen by each problem instance that sets
all ul and b¯l. Thus, (15) holds in a number of cases that depends on how many of the 2hLh possible assignments of
all ul and b¯l satisfy it. The only feasible cases are for h > 1, and to analyse them we assume K = {0, . . . , h− 1}
(the disagreements occur in the first h ordered indexes) without loss of generality.
Moreover, when (15) holds for some {b¯l}n−1l=0 it also holds for {1−b¯l}n−1l=0 . Hence, we may count the configurations
that verify (15) with b¯0 = 0, knowing that their number will be only half of the total. With this, the configurations
with b¯0 = 0 must have b¯l = 1 for at least one l > 0 in order to satisfy (15), giving 2h−1 − 1 total cases to check.
The following paragraphs illustrate that, for h < L, the number of configurations that verify (15) can be written
as a polynomial of order h− 1. With this in mind we can start with the explicit computation for h = {2, 3}. For
h = 2, there is only one feasible assignment for the {b¯l}n−1l=0 , so u0 = u1 in (15), which makes 2L cases out of
22L2. For h = 3, one has 3 feasible assignments for the {b¯l}n−1l=0 . Due to the symmetry of (15) all the configurations
have the same behaviour and we may focus on, e.g., b¯0 = b¯1 = 0 and b¯2 = 1⇒ u0 +u1 = u2; this can be satisfied
only when u0 + u1 ≤ L, i.e., for L(L−1)2 configurations. This makes a total of 2 · 3 · L(L−1)2 = 3L(L− 1) over the
23L3 possible configurations.
For h > 3, this procedure is much less intuitive; nevertheless, we can at least prove that the function Ph(L)
counting the configurations for which (15) holds is a polynomial in L of degree h−1. To show this, let us proceed
in three steps.
1) Indicate with pib¯ the (h − 1)-dimensional subspace of Rh defined by
∑
l∈K
b¯l=0
ξl −
∑
l∈K
b¯l=1
ξl = 0, ξ ∈ Rh. The
intersection αb¯(L) = {1, . . . , L}h ∩ pib¯ is such that each assignment of {ul}h−1l=0 ∈ {1, . . . , L}h satisfying (15)
is an integer point in αb¯. To count those points define βb¯(L) = {0, . . . , L+ 1} ∩ pib¯ and note that the number
of integer points in αb¯ is equal to the number of integer points in the interior of βb¯ (the points on the frontier
of βb¯ have at least one coordinate that is either 0 or L+ 1).
Note how {0, . . . , L + 1}h scales linearly with L + 1 while pib¯ is a subspace and therefore scale-invariant.
Hence, their intersection βb¯(L) is an h−1-dimensional polytope that scales proportionally to the integer L+1,
as required by Ehrhart’s theorem [41]. The number Eb¯(L) of integer points in βb¯(L) is then a polynomial
in L + 1 (and so L) of degree equal to the dimensionality of βb¯(L), i.e., h − 1. From Ehrhart-Macdonald’s
reciprocity theorem [42] we know that the number of integer points in the interior of βb¯ and thus in αb¯ is
(−1)h−1Eb¯(−L), that is also a polynomial in L of degree h− 1.
2) If two different assignments {b¯′l}h−1l=0 and {b¯′′l }h−1l=0 are considered, then αb¯′(L)∩αb¯′′(L) = {1, . . . , L}h∩pib¯′ ∩
pib¯′′ . The same argument we used above tells us that the number of integer points in such an intersection is a
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polynomial in L of degree h − 2 and, in general that the number of integer points in the intersection of any
number of polytopes αb¯(L) is a polynomial of degree not larger than h− 1.
3) The number of configurations of {ul}h−1l=0 and {b¯l}h−1l=0 that satisfy (15) with respect to the above K is the
number of integer points in the union of all possible polytopes αb¯, i.e.,
⋃
{b¯l}h−1l=0 αb¯(L). Such a number can be
computed by the inclusion-exclusion principle that amounts to properly summing and subtracting the number
of integer points in those polytopes and their various intersections. Since sum and subtraction of polynomials
yield polynomials of non-increasing degree, we know that number is the evaluation of a polynomial Ph(L)
with degree not greater than h− 1.
Let us then write Ph(L) =
∑h−1
j=0 p
h
jL
j . In order to compute its coefficients phj we may fix a binary configuration
{bl}h−1l=0 , count the points {ul}h−1l=0 ∈ Nh+ for which (15) is verified by means of integer partition functions (that
also have a polynomial expansion), and subtract the points in which {ul}h−1l=0 /∈ {1, . . . , L}h. By summation over
all binary configurations, one can extract the coefficients associated with Lj for each h. Table I reports the result
of this procedure as carried out by symbolic computation for h ≤ 15.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS ON THE CLASS-UPGRADE KPA
Proof of Proposition 2: In this case the attacker knows (A(0), x, y), and is able to calculate εj = yj −∑n−1
l=0 A
(0)
j,l xl =
∑n−1
l=0 ∆Aj,lxl where the ∆Aj,l are unknown. For the j-th row, the attacker also knows there are
cj non-zero elements in ∆Aj,l = −2A(0)j,l bl with bl ∈ {0, 1} binary variables that are 1 if the flipping occurred
and 0 otherwise. Note that from the above information cj =
∑n−1
l=0 bl. With this we define a set of even weights
Dl = −2A(0)j,l xl ∈ {−2L, . . . ,−2, 0, 2, . . . , 2L} so the KPA is defined by satisfying the equalities
εj =
n−1∑
l=0
Dlbl (16)
cj =
n−1∑
l=0
bl (17)
To obtain a standard γ-SSP with positive weights and γ = cj we sum 2L to all Dl so (16) becomes εj +
2L
∑n−1
l=0 bl =
∑n−1
l=0 (Dl+2L)bl. Multiplying both sides by 1/2 and using (17) yields υ =
1
2εj +Lcj =
∑n−1
l=0 ulbl
where ul = −A(0)j,l xl + L ∈ {0, . . . , Q}. Q = 2L. Finally, we exclude ul = 0 to facilitate the attack.
Proof of Theorem 3: Assume Fp(a, b) and Gp(a, b) as in (11),(12). Define the normalised constraint r =
cj
n
and two quantities a(τ, r) and b(τ, r) that are the solutions of the following system of equalities
r = F0(a, b)
τ = F1(a, b)
that are respectively equivalent to [18, (5.3-4)]. We also define
G(τ, r) =
G0(a (τ, r) , b (τ, r)) G1(a (τ, r) , b (τ, r)
G1(a (τ, r) , b (τ, r) G2(a (τ, r) , b (τ, r))

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With this, [18, (5.8-9)] prove that the number of solutions of a γ-SSP with integer coefficients {ul}n−1l=0 uniformly
distributed in {1, . . . , Q}, Q = 2L, γ = cj is
SSteve(τ, n, L, r) = e
n(a(τ,r)τ−b(τ,r)r)
4pinL
√
det (G(τ, r)) · (18)
· e
n
∫ 1
0
log
[
1 + eb(τ,r)−a(τ,r)ξ
]
dξ
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we average on τ and obtain an expression identical to (13)
for the computation of Eτ [SSteve(τ, n, L, r)]. Since SSteve(τ, n, L, r) has once again an approximately Gaussian
profile in τ with a maximum in τ = r2 we approximate the expectation in τ ,
Eτ [SSteve(τ, n, L, r)] n→∞' SSteve
(r
2
, n, L, r
) 1√
2
=
√
3
2
r−1−nρ (1− r)−1−n(1−r)
2pinL
(19)
by using the fact that a
(
r
2 , r
)
= 0 and b
(
r
2 , r
)
= log
(
r
1−r
)
.
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